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We measure the social preferences of a sample of US medical
students and compare their preferences with those of the gen-
eral population sampled in the American Life Panel (ALP). We
also compare the medical students with a subsample of highly
educated, wealthy ALP subjects as well as elite law school stu-
dents and undergraduate students. We further associate the het-
erogeneity in social preferences within medical students to the
tier ranking of their medical schools and their expected spe-
cialty choice. Our experimental design allows us to rigorously dis-
tinguish altruism from preferences regarding equality–efficiency
tradeoffs and accurately measure both at the individual level
rather than pooling data or assuming homogeneity across sub-
jects. This is particularly informative, because the subjects in our
sample display widely heterogeneous social preferences in terms
of both their altruism and equality–efficiency tradeoffs. We find
that medical students are substantially less altruistic and more
efficiency focused than the average American. Furthermore, med-
ical students attending the top-ranked medical schools are less
altruistic than those attending lower-ranked schools. We further
show that the social preferences of those attending top-ranked
medical schools are statistically indistinguishable from the prefer-
ences of a sample of elite law school students. The key limitation
of this study is that our experimental measures of social prefer-
ences have not yet been externally validated against actual physi-
cian practice behaviors. Pending this future research, we probed
the predictive validity of our experimental measures of social pref-
erences by showing that the medical students choosing higher-
paying medical specialties are less altruistic than those choosing
lower-paying specialties.
social preferences | altruism | fair-mindedness | equality–efficiency
tradeoff | rationality
The behavior expected of sellers of medical care is different from that
of business men in general. . . His behavior is supposed to be governed
by a concern for the customer’s welfare which would not be expected
of a salesman (1).
Medicine is one of the few spheres of human activity in which the
purposes are unambiguously altruistic (2).
Social preferences are important inputs into broader measuresof social welfare and enter many realms of decision-making.
Obvious examples include cooperation (3, 4), redistribution (5,
6), and public goods generation (7, 8), which in turn, shape fun-
damental societal structures ranging from local commons to glob-
alization among others. In all of these settings, problems of coop-
eration and conflict arise in connection with the distribution of
resources under conditions of scarcity. These problems arise not
only because people promote their competing private interests
but also, because people who are motivated by morality to pro-
mote the interests of others will often disagree about what moral-
ity requires either in general or in particular situations (9–11).
Within academic discourse, the theoretical and empirical anal-
yses of social preferences, therefore, have implications in a host
of areas, which cut across disciplines ranging from economics
through philosophy to law and more. In the policy arena, appro-
priately confronting theories of social preferences with empiri-
cal or experimental evidence has implications for public policy
decisions, which often hover uncertainly between interest com-
petition and moral disagreement. Economics, both in its theoret-
ical apparatus and in its experimental methods, has successfully
advanced understanding of the effects that social preferences—
specifically through their heterogeneity—have on conflict and
cooperation in conditions of scarcity.∗ Properly understanding
these social preferences will require additional study of hetero-
geneity in behavior across individuals.
Social preferences are especially salient in health care, which
is marked by resource scarcity (20), produces public goods with
broad impacts on society’s wellbeing, and at the same time,
is fraught with information asymmetry and competing interests
among providers, patients, and payers of care (1). In this paper,
we study the social preferences of US medical students, a group
that holds particular interest, because physicians are central to
resource allocation in and quality of health care in a society. In
their treatment decisions as well as decisions to adopt new scien-
tific/medical technologies, physicians make fundamental trade-
offs between their own (financial) self-interest, patient benefit,
and stewardship of social resources. In all of these cases, under-
standing physicians’ choices requires understanding the social
preferences that are behind them. Furthermore , studying med-
ical students (as opposed to practicing physicians) allows us to
examine the “baseline” social preferences of medical profession-
als before their exposure to complex incentives in the environ-
ment in which physicians practice, as these incentives may shape
social preferences in ways that make directions of causality diffi-
cult to disentangle.
This topic is particularly relevant at present: health insur-
ers and governments in the United States and elsewhere have
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increasingly questioned reliance on physician professionalism as
a safeguard for patients’ interests and society’s resources and are
turning to financial rewards and penalties tied to measurement of
individual physician performance (21, 22). There is also an exten-
sive literature showing that physicians do respond to financial
incentives in medical decision-making (23–27). However, some
health care leaders argue that many aspects of physician per-
formance cannot be monitored and that performance incentives
can have unintended negative consequences; thus, we inevitably
must rely on physician trustworthiness in much of medicine (28,
29). The optimal balance in any medical area between trust of
physician professionalism and costly government regulation will
depend critically on the nature of social preferences (and result-
ing behavioral tradeoffs) among the physicians in that area of
medicine.
Social preferences may naturally be divided into two compo-
nents that often operate together but are conceptually distinct—
the tradeoff between altruism and self-interest (the weight on
own welfare vs. the welfare of others) and the tradeoff between
equality and efficiency (the weight on reducing differences in
welfare vs. increasing total welfare). From Harsanyi (30, 31) and
Rawls (32)—and the enormous literature that they spawned—
there is certainly no a priori reason to insist that more altruis-
tic people will necessarily place a greater weight on equality vs.
efficiency.
In fact, both Harsanyi (30, 31, 33) and Rawls (32) argue
that the fair-minded place equal weight on themselves and
others, so that their distributive decisions “satisfy the impar-
tiality and impersonality requirements to the fullest possible
degree” (33). Harsanyi (30, 31, 33) and Rawls (32) nonethe-
less came to opposite conclusions about how fair-minded peo-
ple should trade off equality and efficiency—Harsanyi’s util-
itarian view is that social preferences should maximize total
welfare (efficiency), whereas the Rawlsian view is that they
should minimize differences in welfare (equality). The distinc-
tions that we draw are, therefore, straightforward and capture
important differences.
Physicians’ altruism—the concern for patient health and well-
being beyond own self-interest—has been reinforced by ethical
guidelines, such as those in the Hippocratic Oath; physicians
constantly face decisions that involve tradeoffs between patients’
health and financial wellbeing vs. physicians’ self-interest (1),
such as whether to recommend a lucrative procedure to patients
for whom there might be little expected benefit. The other
equally important component of physicians’ social preferences—
the tradeoff between equality and efficiency—is not addressed in
the Hippocratic Oath, despite its centrality to physicians’ willing-
ness to “ration” patient access to low-benefit care in the interests
of a more efficient health care system and the aggregate impact
that this has on society’s ability to finance needed care.†
Economic theory raises intriguing questions about social pref-
erences. Insofar as social preferences are rational (in the sense of
a complete and transitive preference ordering), the techniques
of economic analysis may be brought to bear on modeling and
predicting behavior governed by these preferences by exploring
the structure of the (social) utility functions that rationalize the
observed behavior. This highlights the need to develop a rigor-
ous test of the rationality of social preferences. The problem is
a difficult one. A definitive answer requires experimental tech-
niques that are capable of generating suitably rich choice data
and econometric techniques for assessing the data.
Our primary methodological contribution is an experimen-
tal technique that allows for the collection of richer data about
†Physicians are central decision-makers in the health care industry (34), the expenditure
on which constitutes $3.2 trillion US or 17.8% of the US gross domestic product in 2015
(35). Almost one-third of the expenditure on health care is considered wasted on care
that has little benefit (36), which may be in part caused by physicians acting on self-
interest as well as their unwillingness to refuse patient care requests because of social
preferences weighted toward equality.
physician preferences than has heretofore been achieved (37).
Examining behavior at the individual level is a key step in prop-
erly understanding social preferences and interactions. A graph-
ical interface was developed for this purpose, where subjects see
on a computer screen a geometrical representation of choice
problems and make choices through a simple point and click
design. This intuitive and user-friendly interface allows for the
quick and efficient elicitation of many decisions per subject
under a wide range of choice scenarios.
The experiment is specifically designed to distinguish altruism
from equality–efficiency tradeoffs and measure these two com-
ponents of social preferences in a sample of medical students.
The experiment involves allocating real money between the med-
ical student subject herself and a random individual from the
American Life Panel (ALP), a panel broadly representative of
the US population. For comparative purposes, we present our
medical students data alongside data collected using identical
experiments with ALP subjects. Like a medical student subject,
an ALP subject also divided money between herself and an indi-
vidual chosen at random from among the ALP members not sam-
pled for the experiment.
Our main findings are as follows. The subjects in our sam-
ples display widely heterogeneous social preferences. Despite
this heterogeneity, we find significant differences in the social
preferences of subjects across samples in terms of both their
altruism and equality–efficiency tradeoffs. Specifically, the med-
ical students are significantly less altruistic and more efficiency
focused than the general population. In addition, medical stu-
dents in schools ranked among the top 10 in the United States
are less altruistic than those in lower-ranked schools, and medi-
cal students choosing high-income specialties are less altruistic
than those choosing low-income specialties. The fact that our
experimental measures predict the career choices of the medical
student subjects shows that these measures meaningfully capture
individual social preferences that govern real world decisions.
We further compare our sample of medical students with sev-
eral elite samples: an elite ALP sample (37) (defined in Future
Physician Vs. Other Elites), a sample of University of California,
Berkeley (UCB) undergraduates (38), and a sample of Yale Law
School (YLS) students (37). The medical student subjects are
indistinguishable from the ALP elite subjects in terms of altru-
ism but are more altruistic than both the YLS and UCB subjects.
Furthermore, the medical student subjects are slightly more effi-
ciency focused than both the ALP elites and UCB subjects, and
they are less efficiency focused than the YLS subjects. However,
there are no significant differences in altruism and equality–
efficiency tradeoffs between the medical students at top-ranked
schools and the sample of YLS students.
A crucial concern about this study is its external validity, as our
experimental measures of social preferences of medical students
have not yet been shown to predict actual physician practice
behaviors. This is an open question and important topic for addi-
tional research that we plan to undertake based on extensions of
this experimental design. Pending that future research on actual
physician behavior, we show predictive validity by showing that
the social preferences, as captured in our experiment, are related
in an understandable way to the (early) career choice of medical
students as well as the real world decisions of the comparator
subject pools.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Experiment sum-
marizes the experimental design and procedures, and Subject
Pools describes the subject pools. Empirical Framework provides
the template for analysis, and Experimental Results contains the
results. External Validity summarizes closely related papers using
this experimental technique, as we are building on the datasets
and expertise that we have acquired in previous work (17, 37–
39). This is followed by Concluding Remarks.
Experiment
Design. We restrict attention to dictator games and ignore the
complications of strategic behavior and reciprocity motivations
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in response games to focus on behavior motivated purely by
social preferences. Nonstrategic behavior is simpler to analyze
and is, moreover, adequate for decomposing social preferences
into altruism and equality–efficiency tradeoffs. In the experi-
ment, we presented subjects with a sequence of 50 decision prob-
lems. Each decision problem is presented as a choice from a 2D
budget line. The budget line is a concept derived from microe-
conomics consumer theory, which represents all possible quan-
tity combinations of two goods that an individual consumer can
purchase given a fixed amount of monetary endowment and the
prices of the two goods. In this application, the two “goods” that
the subject is asked to choose between are experimental tokens
(a symbolic unit that carries monetary value) allocated to self
(the subject) vs. tokens allocated to an anonymous other (an ALP
member chosen at random). Throughout, we denote persons self
and other by s and o, respectively, and the associated monetary
payoffs by pis and pio , respectively.
In a standard dictator experiment, self divides some endow-
ment m between self and other in any way he wishes, such that
pis + pio =m . One respect in which this framework is restrictive
is that the set of feasible payoff pairs is always the line with a
slope of −1, so that the problem faced by self is simply allocat-
ing a fixed total income between self and other. Since a great
deal of consumer theory is built on the assumption of a simple
linear budget line, we study a modified dictator game, in which
self must allocate an endowment m across pi= (pis , pio) at prices
p = (ps , po). Without essential loss of generality, assume that the
endowment m is normalized to one. The budget line is then
pspis + popio = 1,
and the subject can choose any allocation pi= (pis , pio) that sat-
isfies this constraint. Thus, this configuration creates budget
lines over pis and pio that allow for the thorough testing of the
decomposition of social preferences at the level of the individual
subject. Specifically, changing the relative price ps/po = p¯io/p¯is ,
where p¯is and p¯io denote the end points of the budget line,
allows us to examine individual responses to changes in the price
of giving.
Procedures. Our experimental interface was incorporated into
the ALP, and the experiment was conducted online under the
ALP protocol. As a result, we have been able to conduct identical
web-based experiments with medical student subjects and ALP
subjects. The procedures described below are identical to those
used by ref. 39. The medical student subjects were informed that
the ALP is designed to be representative of the population of US
adults (ages 18 y old and older) and were given the link to the
ALP website. More information and full experimental instruc-
tions are available in SI Appendix.
Each decision problem in the experiment started with the com-
puter selecting a budget line randomly from the set of budget
lines that intersect with at least one of the axes at 50 or more
experimental tokens but with no intercept exceeding 100 tokens.
Subjects see the budget lines on a computer screen and choose
allocations through a simple point and click.‡ A choice of the
allocation (x , y) from the budget line represents an allocation
between accounts x , y (corresponding to the usual horizontal
and vertical axes). The actual payoffs of a particular choice are
as follows: self receives the tokens allocated to the y account
(pis), and other receives the tokens allocated to the x account
(pio). At the end of the experiment, the computer selected one
decision round for each subject, where each round had an equal
probability of being chosen, and self and other were paid the
amount that they had earned in that round. Payoffs were calcu-
‡It is, of course, possible that presenting choice problems graphically biases choice
behavior in some particular way—and that is a useful topic for experiment—but there is
no evidence that this is the case. For instance, behavior elicited graphically in the work
by Fisman et al. (17) is quite consistent with behavior elicited by other means (18).
lated in terms of tokens and then converted into dollars, where
1 token = $0.25.§ Finally, we had our medical student subjects
complete a postexperiment survey, which elicited their sociode-
mographic information as well as information on their medical
education and future career choices.
The experimental design has a number of advantages over
other designs. First, the choice of a bundle subject to a bud-
get constraint provides more information about preferences
than a typical discrete choice. Second, because the interface is
extremely user-friendly, it is possible to present each subject
with many choices in the course of a single experimental session,
yielding a much larger dataset. This makes it possible to analyze
behavior at the level of the individual subject without the need
to pool data or assume that subjects are homogeneous. Third,
because choices are from standard budget sets, we are able to use
classical revealed preference analysis to decide if subject behav-
ior is consistent with rationality and classical demand analysis to
recover information about the underlying preferences.
Methodology. The modified dictator games that vary the relative
price of redistribution were first used by Andreoni and Miller
(16).¶. The graphical interface pioneered by Choi et al. (40) and
exploited by Fisman et al. (17, 37–39) to analyze social prefer-
ences and by Choi et al. (41, 42) and Ahn et al. (43) to analyze
risk preferences allows subjects to make numerous choices over
a wide range of budget sets, and this yields a rich dataset that is
well-suited to analysis at the level of the individual subject. The
analysis of these experimental and field data consists of a combi-
nation of structural and descriptive work and provides corrobo-
ration of the work presented here.
The baseline experiment of Fisman et al. (17) uses budget sets
over feasible payoff pairs, identical to the experiment reported
here. This experiment is also identical to that of Andreoni and
Miller (16), except for presenting the choice problems graphi-
cally, and therefore, the results of these studies are directly com-
parable. Although Fisman et al. (17) test a much wider range
of budget sets than can be tested using the pencil and paper
questionnaire method of Andreoni and Miller (16), the behavior
elicited graphically is consistent with the behavior elicited non-
graphically as well as with the behavior elicited by other means.#
To summarize, the experimental design has a number of
advantages over other designs. First, the choice of a bundle sub-
ject to a budget constraint provides more information about
preferences than a typical discrete choice. Second, because the
interface is extremely user-friendly, it is possible to present each
subject with many choices in the course of a single experimen-
tal session, yielding a much larger dataset. This makes it possible
to analyze behavior at the level of the individual subject without
the need to pool data or assume that subjects are homogeneous.
Third, because choices are from standard budget sets, we are able
to use classical revealed preference analysis to decide if subject
behavior is consistent with rationality and classical demand anal-
ysis to recover information about the underlying preferences.
Subject Pools
Medical Students Sample. The 503 medical student subjects in
the experiment were recruited from all 4 y of study in nine
§The medical student subjects received their payment in Amazon gift cards, and ALP
members received their payment via the ALP reimbursement system using a direct
deposit into their bank account.
¶We will not attempt to review the enormous experimental literature on social pref-
erences. Camerer (18) and Cooper and Kagel (19) provide excellent surveys that the
reader may wish to consult.
#Two additional experiments are included in the analysis of Fisman et al. (17). i) An
extensive elaboration uses three-person budget sets to distinguish tradeoffs between
self and other and between other and other. ii) An intensive elaboration uses noncon-
vex sets to distinguish between choices that are compatible with well-behaved prefer-
ences (continuous, increasing, and concave) and those that are compatible only with
not well-behaved cases.
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accredited Doctor of Medicine (MD)-granting medical schools
around the United States. We approached 73 of all 122 accred-
ited MD-granting US medical schools in alphabetical order. Of
the 12 medical schools that agreed to participate in our study, we
chose 9 schools based on their representativeness in both ranking
[according to the 2015 US News and World Report research rank-
ing of medical schools (44)] and geographical location, including
schools in the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West regions of
the country.
To show the predictive validity of the preference parameters
elicited, we test whether the medical student subjects’ social pref-
erences, as measured in our experiment, are reflected in two
career choices/outcomes.
i) The first career choice/outcome is the ranking of their med-
ical school. If one considers those attending high-ranking
medical schools as elite future physicians, then the social
preferences of elite physicians have particular significance
considering the possibility that their expert opinions have
even wider influence on medical practice and resource alloca-
tion than average physicians.‖ We thus divide the nine medi-
cal schools in our sample into two tiers. Three schools ranked
among the top 10 in the nation are classified as tier 1. The
remaining six schools are classified as tier 2. The numbers of
medical student subjects in tiers 1 and 2 schools are 103 and
400, respectively.
ii) The second career choice/outcome is (self-reported) expected
specialty choice. Comparing social preferences for medical
students choosing different specialty career paths is especially
meaningful in the United States, where large variation in
income and practice patterns across medical specialties (46)
presents potentially different opportunities for personal gains
for physicians.∗∗ Given the disproportionately high number
of specialists vs. primary care physicians in the United States
(48), whether medical students sort into different specialties
based on social preferences is a question of great policy inter-
est. Of the 503 medical student subjects, 399 indicated a spe-
cialty choice in the postexperiment survey. Based on specialty
income data of nationwide physician surveys (49), the income
of the specialties indicated by our medical students sample
averages to $323,000 across subjects. In the analysis below, we
use $300,000 as the cutoff point of annual income between
high- and low-income specialties. The numbers of medical
student subjects that indicate high- and low-income special-
ties are 181 and 185, respectively.
In SI Appendix, Table S1, we report summary statistics on the
basic sociodemographic characteristics of our medical student
subjects by subsamples—tiers 1 and 2 schools and high- and low-
income specialties. We also provide more information on the
high- and low-income specialties classification in SI Appendix,
Table S2.
ALP Sample. The overall sample of ALP respondents is broadly
comparable to the US population in terms of demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics.†† To focus on ALP subjects com-
parable in age with the medical student subjects, we restrict
attention to 267 subjects ages 22–32 y old. To obtain a sufficiently
‖Three of five current physician members of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commis-
sion, an expert panel advising Congress on Medicare issues, obtained their MD from
medical schools among the top 10 in the United States (45).
∗∗For instance, specialists performing medical procedures are routinely reimbursed sev-
eral fold more than primary care physicians for office visits, even when visits are of
similar duration (47).
††Fisman et al. (39) have detailed information on the ALP subject pool and a compari-
son of the ALP and the American Community Survey conducted by the US Census and
representative of the US population. Like the US population, the ALP sample includes
an enormous amount of demographic, socioeconomic, and geographic diversity. Impor-
tantly, the ALP contains subjects from underrepresented groups in terms of age, educa-
tional attainment, household income, occupational status, and place of residence.
large sample of ALP subjects in this age range, we use data from
our previous work (37, 39) collected in 2013 and 2014 as well
as data from an additional round of experiments conducted in
2016. In SI Appendix, Table S1, we report the sociodemographic
characteristics of our ALP subject pool, which contains under-
represented groups in terms of ethnicity, educational attainment,
occupational status, and place of residence. As expected, the
medical student subjects are more educated than the overwhelm-
ing majority of the ALP subjects, of whom 48.3% hold college
degrees. Also, only 44.5% of the medical student subjects are
female compared with 67.7% of the ALP subjects. With regard
to ethnic diversity, the fraction of underrepresented minorities
(African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans) in the med-
ical students sample is 10.8% compared with 38.6% in the ALP
sample. We include controls for age and gender in our regression
analyses below.
Empirical Framework
The most basic question to ask about choice data is whether
they are consistent with individual utility maximization. If budget
sets are linear (as in our experiment), Afriat’s (50) theorem tells
us that, if a finite dataset generated by an individual’s choices
satisfies Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP),
then the data can be rationalized by a well-behaved (piece-
wise linear, continuous, increasing, and concave) utility function
us(pis , pio).
We assess how nearly the data comply with GARP by calcu-
lating Afriat’s (51) Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI). This
measures the amount by which each budget constraint must be
relaxed to remove all violations of GARP. The CCEI is bounded
between zero and one. The closer it is to one, the smaller the
perturbation of budget sets required to remove all violations and
thus, the closer the data are to satisfying GARP. We provide
more details on testing for consistency with GARP in Materials
and Methods.
Additionally, we suppose that us(pis , pio) is a member of the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) family commonly used
in demand analysis. The CES utility function is given by
us = [α(pis)
ρ + (1− α)(pio)ρ]
1
ρ ,
where 0≤α≤ 1 represents the relative weight on the payoff for
self (altruism), ρ≤ 1 represents the curvature of the indifference
curves (equality–efficiency tradeoffs), and σ= 1/(ρ − 1) is the
(constant) elasticity of substitution. Those with α= 1 (α = 0)
are perfectly selfish (perfectly altruistic), as they put all weight
on the payoff to self (other). Those with α= 1/2 are fair-minded
in the sense that they place equal weight on the payoffs to self
and other. The CES approaches a perfect substitutes utility func-
tion as ρ→ 1 and the Leontief form as ρ→−∞. As ρ→ 0, the
indifference curves approach those of a Cobb–Douglas function.
More generally, any ρ> 0 (ρ< 0) indicates social preference
weighted toward efficiency (equality), because popio decreases
(increases) when the relative price ps/po decreases.
We emphasize again that the graphical representation enables
us to collect many more observations per subject, and therefore,
our estimations will be done for each subject n separately. This
allows us to test for heterogeneity of social preferences. We pro-
vide more details on the CES model and estimation in Materials
and Methods.
Experimental Results
We first examine the differences in social preferences between
the medical student subjects and the diverse sample of Ameri-
cans in the ALP subject pool. We then examine the differences
in social preferences between medical students attending tier 1
and tier 2 medical schools and between medical students choos-
ing high-income and low-income specialties. Last, we examine
the differences between the social preferences of our medical
student subjects and the social preferences of the sample of elite
ALP subjects, a sample of intermediate elite UCB undergradu-
ate students, and a sample of YLS students.
E10294 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1705451114 Li et al.
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In each part, we begin our analysis of the experimental
data by testing for consistency with utility maximization using
revealed preference axioms. We then move to recovering the
conceptually distinct components of the underlying distribu-
tional preferences—the tradeoff between altruism and self-
interest and the tradeoff between equality and efficiency—by
estimating CES demand functions for giving at the individual
level. Finally, we briefly discuss results comparing social pref-
erences between medical students and other elite samples. We
provide summary statistics of CCEI and CES parameters for all
samples in SI Appendix, Table S3.
Future Physicians Vs. the General Population. The mean and
median CCEI scores in the medical students sample are 0.93
and 0.98, respectively, indicating that most medical students
exhibit behavior that is optimizing in the sense that their choices
nearly satisfy GARP, so that the violations are minor enough to
ignore for the purposes of recovering preferences or constructing
appropriate utility functions. The mean CCEI in the ALP sam-
ple is 0.87, and the median is 0.90. Although the CCEI scores
of the ALP subjects are lower than those of the medical student
subjects, the choices of the ALP subjects are also generally con-
sistent with utility maximization.
Fig. 1A below presents the cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) of CCEI scores of both the medical students and ALP
samples. The CDF of the medical students sample is skewed
to the right, which provides a clear graphical illustration of the
extent to which the medical student subjects did worse than
choosing consistently and the extent to which they did bet-
ter than the general population in the ALP sample. A boot-
strapped Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (52, 53) rejects equality of
the two distributions (P < 0.001). (Unless otherwise specified,
all P values reported below are for bootstrapped Kolmogorov–
Smirnov tests.)
Fig. 1 B and C presents the CDFs of the CES estimates αˆn and
ρˆn for both samples, respectively. Fig. 1B shows that the CDF of
the estimated altruism parameter αˆn for the medical students
sample is skewed to the right relative to the distribution of the
ALP sample (P < 0.001), indicating a higher degree of selfish-
ness among future physicians relative to the general population.
Fig. 1C shows that the CDF of the estimated equality vs. effi-
ciency parameter ρˆn of the medical students sample also is to the
right of the ALP sample (P < 0.001), indicating a higher degree
of efficiency orientation in our sample of future physicians.
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Fig. 1. Cumulative distributions of estimated CCEI
(A), αˆn (B), and ρˆn (C) parameters in the medi-
cal student and ALP samples. CCEI measures consis-
tency in decision-making: a higher value indicates
greater consistency; αˆn measures altruism: the rel-
ative utility weight placed on one’s own payoff vs.
the payoff to other, and ρˆn measures the tradeoff
between efficiency and equality: ρˆn values closer to
one indicate greater efficiency focus.
We now turn to an econometric analysis that examines the dif-
ferences between the medical students and ALP samples more
systematically. We define an indicator variable to denote the
medical student sample and use it as the primary explanatory
variable. The results are presented in Table 1. In Table 1, With-
out controls, we present results without individual-level controls,
and in Table 1, Including controls for age and gender, we include
controls for age and gender.
In columns 2 and 3 in Table 1, we present Tobit specifications
with the CCEI and altruism parameter αˆn as the dependent vari-
ables, respectively. The Tobit specifications adjust for censoring
of the dependent variable at one. The estimation results show
that the medical student subjects are significantly more consis-
tent and less altruistic than the ALP subjects after controlling for
age and gender.
In columns 4–7 in Table 1, we present our regression results
on equality–efficiency tradeoffs ρˆn . Since several subjects have
exceptionally low estimated parameter values, the distribution of
ρˆn is highly skewed. We, therefore, estimate quantile regressions
that are less sensitive to extreme values. We report results for the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles in Table 1, columns 4–6, respec-
tively. Finally, in column 7 in Table 1, we present a probit speci-
fication with an indicator for being efficiency focused (ρˆn ≥ 0).
The values of ρˆn are higher in the medical students sam-
ple than in the ALP sample across all three quantiles (Table
1, columns 4–6) and in the probit specification (Table 1, col-
umn 7), indicating that our sample of future physicians is more
efficiency focused than the general population, although the
estimation results are not consistently significant across speci-
fications (there is no significant difference between the medi-
cal students and ALP samples at the 25th percentile quantile
regression after controlling for age and gender or in the probit
specification).
Tier 1 Vs. Tier 2 Medical Schools. Fig. 2 presents the CDFs of CCEI
scores αˆn and ρˆn for the medical student subjects by school
tier. Fig. 2A shows that the CDF of CCEIs for those in tier 1
schools is more right-skewed than that for those in tier 2 schools
(P = 0.006), indicating that those attending top-ranked medi-
cal schools are more consistent with utility maximization than
their counterparts in lower-ranked schools. Fig. 2B shows that
the CDF of αˆn for those in tier 1 schools is more skewed to the
right compared with the CDF for those in tier 2 (P = 0.009),
suggesting that medical students in top-ranked schools are less
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Table 1. Regressions of estimated CES parameters: Medical students vs. ALP
Tobit Quantile regressions
Specification and dependent variable CCEI αˆn 25th: ρˆn 50th: ρˆn 75th: ρˆn Probit:I(ρˆn > 0)
Without controls
Medical student 0.077**** 0.058**** 0.548*** 0.451**** 0.282**** 0.448****
(0.010) (0.016) (0.210) (0.064) (0.026) (0.096)
Observations 770 770 770 770 770 770
Including controls for age and gender
Medical student 0.076**** 0.052*** 0.347 0.328**** 0.254**** 0.372****
(0.011) (0.019) (0.260) (0.081) (0.046) (0.113)
Observations 770 770 770 770 770 770
SEs are in parentheses.
***Significance at the 99% level.
****Significance at the 99.9% level.
altruistic than their counterparts. Lastly, Fig. 2C shows that the
CDF of ρˆn for students in tier 1 schools is again more skewed
to the right (P = 0.005), indicating higher focus on efficiency vs.
equality.
Table 2 presents the comparisons in a regression framework.
The specifications are identical to those in Table 1 above, except
that the sample consists only of the medical student subjects,
and the main independent variable is an indicator for attending
a tier 1 medical school. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2, Without
controls show that the medical student subjects in tier 1 schools
are significantly more consistent and less altruistic than those in
tier 2 schools. The coefficients are almost identical in Table 2,
Including controls for age and gender after adding controls for
age and gender. However, the only coefficient that is significant
among the three quantile regressions in columns 4–6 in Table 2
is the one in the 50th percentile regression, both the magnitude
and significance of which decrease after age and gender are con-
trolled for. The coefficient in the probit specifications in column
7 in Table 2 is also marginally significant after controls are added.
High-Income Vs. Low-Income Specialties. Specialty choice is another
relevant classification that we examined. Before presenting the
results, we note that the distributions of specialty choice are sim-
ilar between those in tier 1 vs. tier 2 schools: the proportion
choosing high-income specialties is 57.1% among medical stu-
dent subjects in tier 1 schools compared with 47.6% in tier 2
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Fig. 2. Cumulative distributions of estimated CCEI
(A), αˆn (B), and ρˆn (C) parameters in the medi-
cal student sample by medical school tier. Tier 1
medical schools are those that are in the top 10
of the US News and World Report (44) rankings of
American medical schools by research. Tier 2 medi-
cal schools are those that are outside of the top 10
in the same rankings.
schools. The difference is statistically insignificant. Fig. 3 shows
that the CDFs of CCEI scores αˆn and ρˆn for medical students
choosing high-income specialties are all more right-skewed than
those choosing low-income specialties, with the most conspicu-
ous difference in the CDFs of αˆn (P = 0.002 for CCEI,P = 0.002
for αˆn , and P = 0.007 for ρˆn). Finally, Table 3 shows a simi-
lar set of regressions as those in Table 2 but instead, with the
indicator for choosing a high-income specialty as the key inde-
pendent variable. The only coefficient that is consistently (and
highly) significant with and without demographic controls is the
one for αˆn reported in column 3 in Table 3, indicating that med-
ical students choosing high-income specialties display a greater
level of selfishness relative to those choosing low-income special-
ties. This significant relationship between our experimental mea-
sures of social preferences of medical student subjects and their
real world career choices provides a useful external validation that
these experimental measures are capturing actual preferences.
Future Physicians Vs. Other Elites. In SI Appendix, we examine the
differences in social preferences between our medical student
subjects and the subsample of ALP elites in the work by Fisman
et al. (37), in which an ALP subject is classified as elite if she
or he is employed, reported an annual household income over
$100,000, and holds a graduate degree. We also examine the dif-
ferences between the social preferences of our medical student
subjects and the social preferences of the sample of UCB and
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Table 2. Regressions of estimated CES parameters: Medical students in tier 1 vs. tier 2 medical schools
Tobit Quantile regressions
Specification and dependent variable CCEI αˆn 25th: ρˆn 50th: ρˆn 75th: ρˆn Probit:I(ρˆn > 0)
Without controls
Tier 1 school 0.045*** (0.016) 0.063** (0.026) 0.313 (0.283) 0.203** (0.091) 0.025 (0.040) 0.220 (0.149)
Observations 503 503 503 503 503 503
Including controls for age and gender
Tier 1 school 0.046*** (0.016) 0.063** (0.026) 0.468 (0.309) 0.191* (0.100) 0.068 (0.055) 0.265* (0.148)
Observations 503 503 503 503 503 503
SEs are in parentheses.
*Significance at the 90% level.
**Significance at the 95% level.
***Significance at the 99% level.
YLS subjects in the work by Fisman et al. (37). SI Appendix, Fig.
S2 and Table S4 show the results comparing medical students
with elite ALP subjects. The medical students are not less altru-
istic than the elite ALP subjects, but they are more consistent
with utility maximization as well as more efficiency focused than
the latter. SI Appendix, Fig. S3 and Table S5 show the results
comparing medical students with UCB subjects. The medical stu-
dents are similar to UCB subjects in terms of consistency but are
more altruistic and more efficiency focused. SI Appendix, Fig. S4
and Table S6 show the results comparing medical students with
YLS subjects. Relative to the YLS subjects, the medical student
subjects are less consistent, more altruistic, and less efficiency
focused. Nevertheless, perhaps most interestingly, SI Appendix,
Fig. S5 and Table S7 show that there are no significant differ-
ences in altruism and equality–efficiency tradeoffs between the
medical student subjects in tier 1 schools and the YLS subjects.
External Validity
The rich dataset that allows us to investigate the social prefer-
ences of medical students at the individual level constitutes the
foundation of this paper’s contribution. Our parameter estimates
vary significantly across subjects, implying that social preferences
are indeed highly heterogeneous. Furthermore, these social pref-
erences vary systematically across groups and in ways that have
not been well-characterized by prior studies that used different
methods. We find that medical students are substantially less
altruistic and more efficiency focused than the average Ameri-
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Fig. 3. Cumulative distributions of estimated CCEI
(A), αˆn (B), and ρˆn (C) parameters in the medi-
cal student sample by expected specialty choice.
Low-income specialties refer to those with national
average income below $300,000 US; high-income
specialties refer to those with national average
income above $300,000 US.
can in the ALP. We further show that the social preferences of
medical students attending top-ranked medical schools are sta-
tistically indistinguishable from the preferences of a sample of
elite law school students at YLS. This last finding emphasizes
the somewhat surprising aspect of social preferences that can be
uncovered using our methodology and adds provocative evidence
about the potential levels of and variation in altruism across dif-
ferent categories of physicians.
A key limitation of this analysis, however, is that our experi-
mental measures of social preferences of medical students have
not yet been externally validated against actual physician practice
behaviors. Whether these measures are predictive of heterogene-
ity in the quality and cost of medical care provided by physicians
is an open question and important topic for additional research.
Pending that future research on actual physician behavior, we
probed the validity of our results by showing that the social pref-
erences of medical students, as captured in our experiment, are
reflected in their (early) career choice. Specifically, medical stu-
dents choosing higher-paying medical specialties are less altruis-
tic than those choosing lower-paying specialties.
Next, we discuss results from prior studies with the differ-
ent subject pools that we use as comparators—ALP, UCB, and
YLS—that show how the measures of social preferences in these
samples are also related in an understandable way (although
undeniably imperfectly) to subjects’ real world decisions in var-
ious settings. This external validity evidence from other sub-
ject pools strengthens the plausibility that medical student social
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Table 3. Regressions of estimated CES parameters: Medical students choosing high-income vs. low-income specialty
Tobit Quantile regressions
Specification and dependent variable CCEI αˆn 25th: ρˆn 50th: ρˆn 75th: ρˆn Probit:I(ρˆn > 0)
Without controls
High-income specialty 0.023* (0.013) 0.064*** (0.024) 0.383 (0.313) 0.146* (0.088) 0.040 (0.040) 0.251* (0.139)
Observations 366 366 366 366 366 366
Including controls for age and gender
High-income specialty 0.015 (0.014) 0.07*** (0.024) 0.036 (0.589) 0.112 (0.100) 0.019 (0.054) 0.097 (0.146)
Observations 366 366 366 366 366 366
SEs are in parentheses.
*Significance at the 90% level.
***Significance at the 99% level.
preferences will also be found to have meaningful external valid-
ity in future studies of actual physician behavior.
i) ALP. Fisman et al. (39) show that the equality–efficiency
tradeoffs ρˆn displayed by ALP subjects in the experiment
predict their political decisions—efficiency orientation is
negatively related to the probability of having voted for
Barack Obama in the 2012 presidential election and also neg-
atively related to the probability of reporting an affiliation
with the Democratic Party—and shed light on how Ameri-
can voters are motivated by their social preferences.
ii) YLS. Fisman et al. (37) show that the experimental mea-
sure of equality–efficiency tradeoffs ρˆn predicts subsequent
career choice of YLS students. Fisman et al. (37) classify
the YLS subjects based on employer type—nonprofit, gov-
ernment/academia, and corporate—and show that the non-
profit (corporate) subsample has a lower (higher) efficiency
orientation relative to other YLS subjects.
iii) UCB. Fisman et al. (38) compared the experimentally mea-
sured social preferences of UCB students under the vastly
different economic conditions that prevailed before and dur-
ing the sharp downturn sparked by the 2008 financial crisis.
They found that subjects who participated in the experiment
during the downturn place greater emphasis on efficiency vs.
equality and display greater levels of selfishness. This also
highlights the predictive validity of our experimental mea-
sure given the complex interrelationship between the busi-
ness cycle and social preferences.‡‡
The immediate next step for future work is to test whether our
experimental measures of social preferences predict actual med-
ical student residency specialty choice as opposed to simply the
stated specialty preferences analyzed here. Even more valuable
will be extending the research agenda to relate our individual-
level measures of social preferences to actual physician prac-
tice behaviors, improving understanding of the characteristics of
those physicians engaging in more vs. less socially desirable prac-
tice behaviors.
Concluding Remarks
The social preferences of future physicians are of particular pol-
icy interest because of the importance of the concern for patient
welfare and the regard for social efficiency in the medical profes-
sion. We adopt an experimental method that allows us to mea-
sure medical students’ altruism as well as how they trade off
equality and efficiency. To interpret these preferences against
proper benchmarks, we compare the measured social prefer-
‡‡Recessionary conditions could either increase or decrease the willingness to sacrifice
equality to enhance efficiency. During a recession, concerns about providing a social
safety net might lead to an increased desire to rein in inequality and guarantee a min-
imum level of income for all, even at the expense of total output. Alternatively, con-
ditions of scarcity may make the prospect of leaving money on the table particularly
unattractive, leading to an increased focus on efficiency. The results of Fisman et al.
(38) suggest that the latter concern dominates.
ences of medical students with those of a general sample of the
US population drawn from the ALP as well as the most highly
educated, wealthy ALP subjects and samples of UCB and YLS
students.
We find that the medical students are substantially less altruis-
tic and more efficiency focused than the average American in
the ALP and that the social preferences of medical students
attending top-ranked medical schools are statistically indistin-
guishable from the preferences of a sample of elite law school
students at YLS. To show the predictive validity of our experi-
mental measure of social preferences, we associate the hetero-
geneity in social preferences within the medical student sample
with the tier ranking of their medical schools as well as their
(expected) medical specialty choice. Although we show that our
experimental measures of social preferences predict the career
choices of medical students, whether these measures are predic-
tive of physicians’ practice behavior and the quality and cost of
medical care is an important topic for additional research.
Keeping in mind this important external validity caveat, our
findings contribute evidence to debates about levels of physi-
cian altruism, which is one of the most fundamental components
of physician professionalism and society’s expectations of physi-
cians. Less altruistic physicians could provide worse medical care
for two reasons. First, they could literally be unscrupulous—
that is, they consciously take actions that benefit them but may
not benefit their patients; second and probably more important,
everyone is affected by their unconscious biases (in this case,
being more or less altruistic). Furthermore, existing research
suggests that professional and clinical guidelines are usually
insufficient to ensure that physicians act in the best interest of
the patients: there is often a considerable amount of uncertainty
with respect to the best clinical practice under specific situations,
and it is often very difficult for the patient or the payer to monitor
or judge the performance of physicians (22, 54).
To capture this wariness that some patients and payers have
with regard to some physicians, economic models of physician
behavior have posited that physician utility and hence, behavior
are a function of both private profit and patient benefit (55–62).
Previous research has documented that physician treatment deci-
sions are indeed responsive to financial incentives in both actual
practice (63–65) and in experimental studies using dictator-like
games (34, 66–69). However, previous studies have not esti-
mated the magnitude of the preference parameters underlying
this tradeoff using a rich choice framework, such as that used
here; thus, those studies have been less successful in modeling
the heterogeneity in social preferences of those individuals or
study the characteristics associated with such heterogeneity.
If future work affirms our conjecture that this experimental
measure of preferences is related to physician practice behav-
iors and especially if our measure predicts behaviors that are not
otherwise easily predictable, then this could suggest scope for
improving a variety of policies and practices. For example, med-
ical schools may consider enhancing the weight on altruism sig-
nals in the admissions process (such as volunteer history) to pos-
itively select candidates who are more likely to be altruistic. This
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may be especially relevant to elite medical schools, whose stu-
dents are found to have similar social preferences to elite law stu-
dents. In addition, the experimental approach used in this study
may serve as an ex post tool to assess the effectiveness of the
screening process in selecting altruistic candidates. More gener-
ally, future applications of our study methodology among prac-
ticing physicians can be used to further test the hypothesis that
nonaltruistic preferences for financial self-interest may be an
important driving factor behind the high volume of high-cost ser-
vices that contributes to the persistently high health care spend-
ing in the United States—which is, in turn, partly attributed to
a disproportionately higher ratio of specialists to primary care
physicians than in other developed countries (46, 70).§§
Beyond altruism, our study quantifies the equality–efficiency
tradeoff of future physicians using this cutting edge methodol-
ogy, rigorously compares the social preferences of future physi-
cians with those of the general population, and also, links these
preference measures to two objective and well-defined outcomes
related to physicians’ career choice. It provides evidence and
lays groundwork for future research that investigates physicians’
social preferences in relation to actual health care, which will fur-
ther inform the extent to which policymakers may want to focus
on medical students social preferences, the medical school admis-
sions process, and/or the specialty composition of physicians.
Materials and Methods
Let
{
(pi ,pii)
}50
i=1
be the data generated by some individual’s choices, where
pi = (pis, p
i
o) denotes the ith observation of the price vector and pi
i = (piis,pi
i
o)
denotes the associated allocation. Then, a nondegenerate (social) utility
function us(pi) is said to rationalize the behavior of self if
us(pi
i) ≥ us(pi) for all pi such that pipii ≥ pipi
(that is, us achieves the maximum on the budget set at the chosen bundle).
Person self is perfectly selfish when us(pi) ≥ us(pi′) if and only if pis ≥ pi′s and
otherwise, displays some form of altruism.
Revealed Preference. We first wish to examine whether the data observed
in our experiment could have been generated by an individual maximizing
a well-defined utility function. If a well-defined utility function us(pis,pio)
that the choices maximize exists, it becomes natural to explore the structure
of the utility functions that rationalize the observed data. Classical revealed
preference theory (50, 71, 72) provides a direct test: choices in a finite col-
lection of budget sets are consistent with maximizing a well-behaved (that
is, piecewise linear, continuous, increasing, and concave) utility function if
and only if they satisfy the GARP.
GARP (which is a generalization of various other revealed preference
tests) requires that, if pii is indirectly revealed preferred to pij , then pij is
not strictly directly revealed preferred (pjpii ≥ pjpij) to pii . It is clear that,
if the data are generated by a nonsatiated utility function, then they must
satisfy GARP. Conversely, Afriat’s (50) theorem tells us that if a finite dataset
generated by an individual’s choices satisfies GARP, then the data can be
rationalized by a well-behaved utility function. The broad range of budget
sets faced by each subject provides a rigorous test of GARP.¶¶
Although testing conformity with GARP is conceptually straightfor-
ward, there is an obvious difficulty: GARP provides an exact test of utility
§§The specialist to primary care physician ratio in the United States is about 70:30, while
in other developed countries, it is 30:70 (48).
¶¶The power of the test depends on two factors. The first is that the range of choice
sets is generated, such that budget lines cross frequently. The second is that the num-
ber of decisions made by each subject is large. This is a crucial point, because in most
experimental studies, the number of individual decisions is too small to provide a pow-
erful test. Building on Becker (73), the Bronars’ test (74) compares the behavior of our
actual subjects with the behavior of simulated subjects who randomize uniformly on
each budget line. The power of Bronars’ test is defined to be the probability that a
random subject violates GARP. To this end, we generated a random sample of 25,000
subjects, and we found that all of them violated GARP—implying the Bronars’ criterion
attains its maximum value—and that their CCEI scores averaged only 0.60. If we choose
the 0.90 efficiency level as our critical value for the CCEI, we find that only 12 of the
random subjects’ CCEI scores were above the threshold, while a large majority of actual
subjects have CCEI scores above 0.90.
maximization—either the data satisfy GARP or they do not—but individ-
ual choices frequently involve at least some errors: subjects may compute
incorrectly, execute intended choices incorrectly, or err in other less obvious
ways. To account for the possibility of errors, we assess how nearly individ-
ual choice behavior complies with GARP by using the CCEI, which measures
the fraction by which each budget constraint must be shifted to remove
all violations of GARP (51). By definition, the CCEI is between zero and
one: indices closer to one mean the data are closer to perfect consistency
with GARP and hence, to perfect consistency with utility maximization. The
work by Chambers and Echenique (75) has details on testing for consistency
with GARP.
Econometric Specification. If subjects’ choices are sufficiently consistent to
justify treating the data as utility generated, Afriat’s theorem (51) tells us
that there exists a well-behaved (social) utility function us(pi) that rational-
izes most of the data. Additionally, we suppose that us(pi) is a member of
the CES family commonly used in demand analysis.## The primary benefit of
the CES formulation is that it makes it possible to distinguish altruism from
equality–efficiency tradeoffs in a particularly convenient manner. The CES
utility function is given by
us(pi)= [α(pis)
ρ
+ (1− α)(pio)ρ]
1
ρ ,
where 0≤α≤ 1 represents the relative weight on the payoff for self (altru-
ism) and ρ≤ 1 represents the curvature of the indifference curves (equality–
efficiency tradeoffs).
This CES formulation is very flexible, since it “spans” a range of well-
behaved utility functions by means of the parameters α and ρ: approaching
perfect substitutesαpis+(1−α)pio as ρ→ 1 and Leontief min{αpis, (1−α)pio}
as ρ→−∞. As ρ→ 0, the CES form approaches Cobb–Douglas piαs pi1−αo ,
which implies that the expenditures on tokens allocated to self and other,
pspis and popio, are equal to α and 1 − α, respectively. More generally,
any ρ> 0 (ρ< 0) indicates social preference weighted toward efficiency
(equality), because popio decreases (increases) when the relative price ps/po
decreases.
When α= 1/2, a subject is fair-minded, and the CES utility func-
tion approaches the utilitarian form pis +pio as ρ→ 1, the Rawlsian form
min{pis,pio} as ρ→ −∞, and the egalitarian form pispio as ρ→ 0. In Fig. 1,
we depict a budget line with ps> po and indifference curves consistent with
these prototypical fair-minded distributional preferences. The quasiconcav-
ity of the indifference curves measures aversion to inequality. Since the
distributional preferences depicted in SI Appendix, Fig. S1 are fair-minded,
the indifference curves are all symmetric with respect to the 45◦ line.
Increasing α above 1/2 will shift the indifference curves toward the
pis axis.
We estimate the CES utility function in terms of expenditure shares pspis
and popio (recall that prices are normalized at each observation, such that
pspis + popio = 1). Because expenditure shares are bounded between zero
and one, we generate the estimates using nonlinear Tobit maximum likeli-
hood. To check sensitivity, we have verified that we generate virtually iden-
tical parameter values if we instead use nonlinear least squares. Fisman et
al. (17) has more information on the econometric analysis.
Institutional Approval. The experiments reported in this paper were approved
by the Committee for Protection of Human Subjects, which serves as Institu-
tional Review Boards for UCB. The payoffs in the experiments depended on
the subject’s decisions and partly, on chance. Participation in the experiment
was completely voluntary. Subjects could decline to take part in the study,
could decline to answer any questions, and were free to stop taking part in
the study at any time. Subjects’ consent forms made clear that there is no
penalty for refusing to participate, declining to answer any questions, and/or
terminating their participation in the study before completed.
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